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Abstract Because ofthe extreme uncertainty in fisheries
biology, efforts to determine a stock-recruitment relationship
have not been entirely successful. In the face of this uncer-
tainty, this paper argues for a change in focus for fisheries
economics from bioeconomic optimization toward goals which
are more modest and more easily achievable. In particular, a
satisficing approach to management is advocated, whereby ef-
forts are made to reallocate some porportion of effort from
overutilized to underutilized fisheries, with no attempt to de-
termine the optimum. In order to achieve such a solution
efficiently, managers must accurately predict the response of
fishermen to public policy. This paper reports on a study which
develops a discrete choice model to predict fishermen's supply
response. Fishermen are shown to respond to economic incen-
tives of expected returns and variability of returns, but only
after these incentives surpass a substantial threshold.
The Argument for Behavioral Modeling
Uncertainty permeates the fishery management problem. This
paper attempts to deal with the complexities arising from a num-
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ber of distinctly different sources of uncertainty in the manage-
ment context. The research attempts to explain fishermen's
behavior by capturing the uncertainty faced by fishermen with
regard to prices and landings. Additionally, the framework em-
ployed explicitly recognizes the uncertainty of fisheries man-
agers regarding fishermen's reactions to regulation. In
particular, fishermen facing the same decision environment are
not necessarily predicted to make identical choices. Instead,
probability distributions over choices are predicted. Of most
importance, however, this paper represents a reaction to the
seemingly insurmountable uncertainty policy makers and re-
searchers face concerning the dynamics offish populations.
For some time fishery scientists have attempted to measure
fish stocks and to model their growth and recruitment, but with-
out overwhelming success. Their difficulties are not attributable
to any lack of effort or ingenuity but rather arise from the fact
that there is far more noise in the system than there is signal.
Scientists have, for example, been unable to estimate reliable
stock-recruitment functions. Yet the calculation of "optimal har-
vest levels," as prescribed by the Fishery Conservation and
Management Act (FCMA), requires in theory the construction
of bioeconomic models reflecting the underlying biological and
economic relationships. In practice, these models have been
dominated by noise and have yielded good predictions only by
chance. Predictions have proven to be very sensitive to the
probability distributions chosen as well as to environmental
parameters which are typically unobservable, unmeasurable, or
at the very least, unpredictable.
There is no question that bioeconomic models are analytically
useful for yielding insight into the nature of the fisheries problem
and for characterizing the optimal solution. However, it is
difficult to place much confidence in the numerical results from
the application of these models, a fact which is particularly
troublesome from a management point of view.
The basic premise of this paper is that optimal harvesting
defined by dynamic bioeconomic criteria is not now an opera-
tionally useful goal, nor is it likely to be in the near future. We
argue here for a fundamentally different approach, narrower inBehavioral Modeling and Fisheries Management 107
scope and less rigorously defensible, yet more likely to succeed
as the basis for pragmatic fisheries management.
We argue that, in the face of overwhelming uncertainty about
fisheries dynamics, an appropriate goal for fisheries management
is the achievement of an acceptable range of tai-get levels of
effort. This "satisficing" approach would require only the deter-
mination of approximate biological, social, and economic mini-
mum requirements in defining the acceptable range.
The task of determining what is acceptable and choosing
among the set of policies which will yield results within the
acceptable range is admittedly subjective. However, these are
decisions for which political processes are well suited. On the
other hand, political processes are not well suited for determin-
ing which policies are capable of satisfying the target goals. This
determination requires input from biologists and economists, but
not to the extent or level of accuracy demanded by bioeconomic
analysis.
The "satisficing" approach to management has the effect of
changing the focus of research endeavors. Once we face the fact
that policy makers cannot have complete control over fishing
effort, predictions of fishermen's response to the economic and
biological environment and to management policies become es-
sential. When behavioral response is incorrectly understood,
regulatory policies can have unexpected and adverse effects,
potentially missing the target range altogether.
In a sense we are arguing for a change in research focus from
the behavior offish to the behavior of fishermen. Unfortunately,
little explicit modeling and estimation of behavioral relationships
has been accomplished to date. Yet the fisherman's decision as
to effort level is perhaps the most important type of behavior to
be understood.
Typically economists have viewed fishing effort as an aggre-
gate variable which responds to any nonzero level of profits
within a fishery. The aggregation is of critical proportions. Not
only do we aggregate over fishermen, but also over types of
decisions which affect total industry effort levels. Both of these
forms of aggregation present potential sources of bias which
need to be considered when dealing with predictions at the108 James J. Opaluch and Nancy E. Bockstael
aggregate level. In order to avoid these potential sources of bias,
the aggregate decision function should be based on the actual
behavior of the fisherman at the microeconomic level.
Aggregating over fishermen leads to bias if parameters of the
micro level decision functions vary or if the industry composi-
tion changes over time. For example, if an increasing proportion
of the industry is adopting some new technology or new size
vessel, parameters of the aggregate decision function will be
changing over time. If these parameters are estimated using ag-
gregated past information, the estimated parameter values will
lag behind the true parameters and will lead to biased parameter
estimates. Employing micro level modeling, however, allows
estimation of parameters which vary over vessel class or tech-
nology. These estimates, combined with information about the
proportion of the industry characterized by that technology, will
yield good predictions.
Aggregation over those types of decisions which affect indus-
try effort levels is potentially even more serious. There are at
least three such decisions: (1) Fishermen already within some
fishery can change their "intensity" of fishing; (2) the distribution
of effort among fisheries can be changed by fishermen switching
among fisheries; and (3) effort can change through entry or exit
from fishing altogether. These three decisions are fundamentally
different choices which occur within different time frames and
which depend upon different factors. Hence aggregating these
into a single effort function is inappropriate. Choosing the num-
ber of days fished is a short-run decision which depends, in part,
upon the absolute level of returns within that particular fishery.
Switching among fisheries, on the other hand, will likely depend
more on relative levels of profitability of the alternative fisheries
than upon the absolute level of profits. To the extent that switch-
ing fisheries requires changing gear or port or learning new
skills, the decision is likely to be an intermediate-run decision
and will require some threshold of potential gain in order to
induce response. Finally, entering or leaving fishing altogether is
a long-run decision which will depend on both the absolute level
of profits and the relative profitability of the alternatives. Be-
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as well as a large investment, one would expect that economic
incentives would need to surpass a substantial threshold before
entry or exit were induced.
Predicting response of effort to economic incentives and to
policies which affect these incentives requires accurate model-
ing of fishermen's behavior at the micro level. Such modeling
allows the separate treatment of different types of decisions as
well as accurate predictions when industry structure and compo-
sition change. What follows is a brief description of an example
of this type of empirical work. A more detailed discussion is
contained in Bockstael and Opaluch (1983).
A Behavioral Model of Allocation of
Fishing Effort Under Uncertainty
The problem is considered from a management point of view,
attempting to predict switching behavior in response to a chang-
ing economic, biological, and regulatory environment. Uncer-
tainty occurs at two levels: Fishermen are uncertain concerning
returns from the various alternatives, and the management
agency is uncertain of the response of fishermen to returns.
Uncertainty at the fisherman level is modeled employing the
usual assumption of expected utility maximization. Fishermen
derive utility from wealth, which is affected by the returns from
fishing. Fishermen are assumed to incorporate information on
past returns from the various fisheries in forming expectations
on future returns. The more profitable a fishery appears, the
more likely it is that an individual will choose that alternative.
However, one would not expect an individual to switch im-
mediately to the most profitable fishery. Because of imperfect
malleability, switching fisheries imposes a variety of costs on the
fisherman. Some of these costs are monetary costs of converting
gear or changing port. Other costs are nonmonetary, such as the
costs of acquiring expertise in a different type of fishery or on
different fishing grounds or the psychic costs of departing from
family tradition or simply overcoming inertia. In any case, one
would expect substantial resistance to changing fisheries, and
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some threshold before an individual would be induced to switch.
From the manager's point of view, uncertainty arises because
Individuals facing the sanie environment are observed to make
different decisions. Some of the variation may be attributed to
observable differences in characteristics, such as differences in
the age or socioeconomic background of the fisherman or differ-
ences in the size or construction of his vessel. There will always
be, however, unobservable characteristics which vary among
individuals and which lead to different behavior.
The utility of the jth individual for the jth alternative, Uy,
depends upon the random wealth which comes about by par-
ticipating in that alternative and an unobservable or random
component, ^,y. That is,
Uij - [Ui (Woi + Rif)] + ^ij (1)
where Wo, is the initial wealth of individual / and /?,y is the /th
individual's return from the7th fishery. A Taylor series expan-
sion of this expression, suppressing subscripts, yields
U(W)= UiWo +ER)+
(2)
where U^'^^ is the /Ih moment of R about its mean. In order to
implement this approach, we need to assume a specific form for
the utility function and a distribution for the random component.
While the choice of a form for the utility function is necessar-
ily somewhat arbitrary, we would like it to be consistent with
reasonable behavioral postulates. It is well known that the log
function exhibits the best properties of the simple functional
forms under uncertainty. This study will employ a second-order
Taylor series approximation to the log utility function about the
expected value for returns, which can be expressed as
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Generalizing this formulation by estimating coefficients on these
two terms yields
(4)
Incorporating the threshold concept described above requires
adding a term, Tj^i reflecting the threshold to the alternative
which the fisherman is now engaged in. The variable Tj^ is a
dummy variable which equals one forj - k, zero otherwise.
Thus, when considering the fishery in which the fisherman was
previously engaged, a constant is added to the expected utility of
wealth. This means that for an alternative fishery to be chosen,
the economic incentive of expected utility of wealth must sur-
pass the incentive from the present fishery by more than the
threshold.
Since the threshold includes both monetary conversion costs
and nonmonetary factors, it is not directly observable. The only
observable measure of the threshold is the observed resistance
to change. For this reason we estimate the threshold by em-
ploying a dummy-variable formulation which accounts for all
sources of resistance—monetary and nonmonetary. The com-
plete behavioral model to be estimated is now
^K'^oi "^ J-'^ij)
(5)
where Tjk is the threshold dummy variable and the O's are es-
timated coefficients.
The final decision required to make the model operational
involves the assumptions on the distribution of 4,y. Normality
assumptions on the ^i/ generate the probit model. If the ^,y are
assumed to be distributed as WeibuU random variables, the logit
model results. We make the WeibuU assumption, because probit
is not computationally tractable for a problem with many alter-
natives.
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individual, discrete models explicitly recognize the uncertain na-
ture of the problem by predicting the probability of an individual
choosing a given altemative. The probabilities can then be em-
ployed in a straightforward manner to predict the proportion of
each group of fishermen, with the same measurable characteris-
tics and facing the same decision environment, which will
choose a given alternative. Again, a strength of this type of
model is that all observably similar fishermen are not predicted
to do the same thing.
The logit formulation leads to a model of the form
(6)
where P,y is the probability that individual i will choose alterna-
tive 7. The parameters of 81, 82, and 83 are then estimated by
maximizing the likelihood function
n
max L = Tl Pjc (7)
(where c is the alternative chosen by the /th individual), that is,
by choosing the parameters which make the observed choices as
likely as possible.
Empirical Results and Conclusions
The model described above was applied to the choice among
fishery alternatives faced by New England fishermen. The appli-
cation is discussed in more detail by Bockstael and Opaluch
(1983). The data consist of a cross-sectional sample of 657
fishermen landing fish in New England ports and include all



























LQ - value of likelihood at zero parameter values
Le = maximum values of likelihood with all three parameters estimated
Lx = maximum value of likelihood with only third parameter estimated
ings records except those less than 5 gross tons or those which
were on the fishing grounds fewer than 100 days in either year.
Each vessel participated in an initial fishery in 1975 and a
subsequent fishery choice in 1976. A fishery alternative was
defined as a group of species which could be harvested by a
single gear type in a given geographical location. Examples of
fishery alternatives include scalloping from New Bedford and
otter trawling from southern New England ports. Depending on
the fisherman's vessel and initial situation, the number of alter-
natives varied between nine and twelve.
The coefficients were estimated using a maximum likelihood
approach, as discussed above. The estimated values for the
coefficients are given in Table 1. All coefficients are significant at
the 95 percent level. A statistic R\ analogous to the multiple
regression R\ indicates that the model explains a substantial
portion of the variation in behavior.
These results can be used to compare different behavioral
models. A naive model of behavior might assume that individu-
als choose randomly among fisheries with equal probability.114 James J. Opaluch and Nancy E. Bockstael
Such a model implies that we have no information with which to
predict fishery choice and thus all coefficients in Equation 1 are
zero. Alternatively, estimating a coefficient on the threshold
leads to a simple inertia model which predicts that some given
proportion of fishermen never switch fishery and that those
fishermen who do switch choose among the alternatives without
regard to economic incentives. Finally, estimating coefficients
on all three variables leads to a model incorporating economic
incentives as an important basis of choice. The likelihood ratio
statistic
-2 Cn^-93.29 (8)
provides a means of testing the value of the economic model
over the naive model and is significant at an extremely high
level. A more meaningful test compares the economic model to
the simple inertia model
-2 £n-^-39.20 (9)
and is again significant at greater than the 99 percent level. This
leads to the conclusion that while the threshold is important,
fishermen do indeed appear to respond to economic incentives.
Besides providing a means of predicting specific quantitative
results (e.g., changes in participation rates in different fisheries
resulting from changes in stocks, prices, etc.), the results sug-
gest a number of interesting qualitative implications for policy.
In considering the actual values of the coefficients, rather than
just their statistical significance, it becomes clear that, a large
change in expected returns is necessary to make a substantial
change in the probability of switching fisheries. Consequently,
while fishermen are shown to respond to economic incentives,
they exhibit a strong inclination toward remaining within the
same fishery over time. Given this result, policies designed to
reallocate effort from overutilized to underutilized species by
differentially affecting returns will need to be rather extreme toBehavioral Modeling and Fisheries Management 115
have any significant effect. In fact, they are likely to be so ex-
treme as to meet with political resistance. Consequently, alter-
native policies which directly influence inertia should perhaps be
an important part of any policy designed to reallocate effort.
In order to determine which policies are likely to be effective,
the important components for the threshold must be identified. If
monetary conversion costs dominate, then subsidies for gear or
port conversion or lump-sum payments may significantly reduce
the threshold. If information asymmetries are important so that
individuals who are not in some fishery at present have relatively
little information about the fishery, then public information ser-
vices may be effective. If fishing skills differ substantially among
the fisheries of interest, then education and training programs
may be useful. In any case, identifying the important compo-
nents of the threshold is likely to be crucial for effective policy
formation and thus represents an important area for future re-
search.
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